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Finlandization and the Peaceful 
Development of China1 
Introduction 
The rise of China has sparked a new type of geopolitical debate in Asian security studies. The 
neighboring countries of China can soon find themselves in a similar geopolitical situation as Finland 
found itself after the Second World War: there was a great power in the vicinity and the balancing 
force of this giant was far away. Consequently, several scholars have started seeking comparative 
evidence that could be applied to the development of possible strategic scenarios for the future of 
China's neighbors. Some scholars have started using the concept of Finlandization as a tool of such 
comparative exercise.2 During the past few years some elements of Finlandization could even be 
found in the subtle policy changes of some of the Chinese neighboring states, as the pace of China’s 
rise has started accelerating. Some scholars suggest elements of Finlandization in the changes of 
South Korean policies of Park Geun-hye administration. 
The study of Finlandization in Asia continues David Kang’s search for policy options between 
balancing and bandwagoning.3 Seeking a third way from the experience of Finland may sound far-
fetched, but since we do not have empirical experience of Asia's future, we will have to use 
comparative empirical cases that have a similar geopolitical context to the one Asia will be 
experiencing with the rise of China. Kang has sought such cases from East Asia’s history, but 
Finland's experience could be another one of such cases. It is also a good comparative case as it has 
been well theorized to allow distilling of lessons from this case to cases that might be similar from 
the point of view of power politics.  
Using Finlandization for the analysis of Asia's future often borrows from the hawkish anti-Soviet 
intellectuals in Austria and West Germany, mainly the right wing politician former Austrian Foreign 
Minister Karl Gruber (in 1953) and German conservative politician Franz Josef Strauss and political 
scientists like Walter Hallstein and Richard Löwenthal. These thinkers accused Finland of 
surrendering to the Soviet Union despite the country’s ideological affiliation with Western 
democracies.4 The concept of Finlandization was invented for the analysis of a mistake to be learned 
from.  
                                                                
1I am grateful for Prof. Chung-in Moon for the idea of looking at Asia through the lense of Finlandization. I am also very 
grateful for the anonymous referees and the Editor-in-Chief of the CJIP for so many constructive suggestions.  
2Vance Chang, “To the Finland Station,” Foreign Affairs 89, no. 3 (June 2010): 128–33; Bruce Gilley, “Not So Dire 
Straits. How the Finlandization of Taiwan Benefits U.S. Security.,” Foreign Affairs, January 2010, 
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65901/bruce-gilley/not-so-dire-straits; Chung-in Moon, “Chinese Rise and Peace 
and Stability in East Asia. Public Lecture at the University of Helsinki, FInland.,” 2014; Hans Mouritzen, “The Difficult 
Art of Finlandization,” Foreign Affairs 89, no. 3 (June 2010): 130–31. 
3 David Kang, “Between Balancing and Bandwagoning: South Korea’s Response to China,” Journal of East Asian 
Studies 9, no. 1 (2009): 1–28; David C. Kang, China Rising: Peace Power and Order in East Asia. (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2007). 
4Walter Hallstein, Europe in the Making. (New York: Norton, 1973); Richard Löwenthal, Vom Kalten Krieg Zur Ostpolitik 
(from Cold War to East Politics) (Stuttgart: Seewald, 1974). 
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At the same time, Asian comparison to the Finnish experience does not have to rely on negative 
interpretations of Finlandization only. Such geopolitical realists as Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew 
Brzezinski, for example, feel that there is something positive to be learned from the Finnish 
experience. This school of thought suggests that Finland yielded in a way that took the Soviet Union’s 
defensive security interests into account without undermining the West’s defensive security interests. 
They claim that the structure of interaction between the West and the East constituted a security 
dilemma, where the traditional military search of security always deteriorated the security of the 
opposing bloc, and thus provoked corresponding military strengthening on the opposing side. This 
way the search of military security never really increased the level of security of either side as it was 
always balanced by military counter measures. In this context Finland's non-threatening strategy was 
seen directly addressing the problem of security dilemma, making Finland’s search for security non-
threatening to others.5 
The intention of this article is to use the concept of Finlandization as a neutral tool for the analysis of 
the possible futures of the emerging political asymmetry in East Asia. Finlandization is treated within 
a geopolitical realist framework and the focus is on those East Asian countries that are currently 
adapting Chinese power by balancing it with the assistance of US power. Finlandization will be seen 
as a theoretical alternative, which could in the future reflect the power realities of growing Chinese 
power. Finlandization will be utilized as a conceptual tool by 
a) analytically and conceptually investigating the dimensions of asymmetry identified in the 
relationship between Finland and the Soviet Union, 
b)  empirically seeking positive and negative lessons (lessons on how to do and how not to do) 
from Finlandization and 
c)   comparatively applying the lessons to the context of the balancing East Asian countries. 
Such an analysis aims to contribute to the debate on how East Asian neighbors of China could find a 
rational strategy towards the rising China. It aims to show how East Asian nations could avoid 
compromising their autonomy by learning from Finland’s mistakes. It also aims to show how they 
could learn from the Finnish way of tackling extensive dependence and the security dilemma.  
My analysis will first define Finlandization and identify the three dimensions of it. The problems and 
the benefits of Finlandization presented in the theoretical literature can be identified in these three 
dimensions. Then these three dimensions will be investigated empirically first in the cold war context 
of Soviet-Finnish relations, and then in the context of China’s relationship with East Asia. Finally, the 
article will conclude the main lessons Finlandization concept and the empirical experience of Finland 
can offer to China and its balancing East Asian neighbors. 
                                                                
5Zbigniew Brzezinski interviewed in Terry Atlas, “Brzezinski Sees Finlandization of Ukraine as Deal Maker,” Bloomberg, 
April 12, 2014, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-04-11/brzezinski-sees-finlandization-of-ukraine-as-deal-
maker.html; Henry A. Kissinger, “Henry Kissinger: To Settle the Ukraine Crisis, Start at the End,” The Washington Post, 
March 5, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/henry-kissinger-to-settle-the-ukraine-crisis-start-at-the-
end/2014/03/05/46dad868-a496-11e3-8466-d34c451760b9_story.html.For the theoretical structure of this argument, see 
Ken Booth and Nicholas J. Wheeler, The Security Dilemma (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008). 
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The geographical focus of the article is on the East Asian balancers, i.e. powers that seek to engage 
US military power in an effort to balance the growing power of China. As such, this article considers 
Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Vietnam, Thailand and Singapore.6 The argument for learning 
from Finlandization is different for balancers than it is for those that some would say, have already 
jumped into the Chinese bandwagon and are not seeking US power to balance the resulting 
asymmetry (North Korea, Myanmar, Laos, Cambodia and Mongolia).7 Therefore, only balancers have 
been focused in this article. Since Finlandization is a strategy somewhere between bandwagoning and 
balancing, it is also more in line with the ethos of geopolitical realism that the concept of 
Finlandization represents, to assume that it is the balancers rather than the bandwagoning nations that 
will have the option of utilizing the lessons of Finlandization once China becomes even mightier.  
Taiwan has been excluded from the analysis even though it, too, balances Beijing’s power with its 
US military support. This is because mutual recognition of sovereignty is one of the normative 
assumptions of the definition of a Finlandized relationship and therefore China’s relationship with 
Taiwan cannot be Finlandized. Vietnam is included in the analysis even though the country is not 
formally in an alliance with the United States and in fact has a conflictual history with the West. This 
is because in the issue of territorial disputes, Vietnam has clearly opted for balancing the Chinese 
threat by inviting US involvement in support of the country’s security if not maritime claims.  
Finlandization as a foreign policy approach 
In order to use Finlandization as a conceptual tool, we must define the concept well. Finlandization 
is an approach that relies on a geopolitical interpretation of realism and applies that approach to a 
relationship of power asymmetry and geographical proximity. In other words, Finlandization is an 
approach that focuses on states, considers power resources as central in world politics, and relates 
them, on the one hand, to the interest of nations to remain sovereign, and on the other to the 
competition of big power for prominence and relative position in world politics. Due to the realist 
focus on power in the debate on Finlandization, specific objectives of Finland or East Asian balancers 
are of secondary influence. The ability of a small country to maintain its independence and territorial 
integrity are the main instrumental values that deserve our attention. These interests, again, are 
crucially dependent, within this geopolitical realist conceptual system, on power resources and 
geography, rather than special national preferences of the states.  
While realism normally considers norms and morality as irrelevant in world politics, it seems clear 
that Finlandization gives defensive interests legitimacy, while considering offensive security 
interests, i.e. ability to challenge the sovereignty and territorial integrity of other countries as 
                                                                
6 Roy calls the Philippines and Singapore soft balancers and adds Vietnam and Malaysia also to the group, albeit with 
hesitation. Thailand Roy sees as a more classical balancer. Since Roy does not cover Northeast Asia, he ignores South 
Korea as one of the balancers. See, Dennis Roy, “Southeast Asia and China: Balancing or Bandwagoning?,” 
Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs 27, no. 2 (2005): 305–22.  
7 As these countries do not ally themselves with China (the defense arrangement between China and North Korea could 
possibly be treated as an alliance), they are not in the bandwagon in the original sense of the term (Quincy Wright, A 
Study of War (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942).)  
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somehow illegitimate. It is possible to identify the same normative stand in the Chinese version of 
geopolitical realism.8 
In order to distinguish between wise and unwise elements of Finland’s strategy, I suggest that 
Finlandization be split into three dimensions. 
Material dependence: In geopolitical realism material dependence is seen the foundation of 
asymmetry between the Finlandizer and the Finlandized9. It is seen as the root cause of the ability of 
the Finlandizer to demand compromises in the autonomy of the Finlandized country. Critics of 
Finland claim that Finland did not manage to limit its dependence on the Soviet Union, while 
defenders of Finland claim the opposite.  
The source of dependence in the case of Finland and East Asia is different. In the case of Finland, 
Soviet Union had just demonstrated its strength in a war, which then demonstrated the asymmetry of 
powers between the two nations. In the case of China's neighbors dependence was a consequence of 
a less dramatic, positive process of economic and political strengthening of China. Yet the objective 
consequence was the same: both found themselves next to a great power, and far away from all those 
powers that could balance the neighboring great power. 
Autonomy: Secondly, the problem of Finlandization is related to degrees of autonomy: how much 
autonomy a small power manages to muster despite the power asymmetry. The question of autonomy 
is not only linked with the material basis of asymmetry, but also with policies: according to the critics 
of Finlandization, small countries could be more principled and stubborn in their relationship with 
their big neighbor, when it comes to questions of sovereignty.  
Adaptation: Thirdly, Finlandization can be identified on the dimension of attentiveness to big 
power's security interests. A small power can be unrealistic about its geopolitical position and this 
could lead into a conflict with the big power and consequently to the loss of independence. At the 
other end of the spectrum there is a risk that the small power is so attentive that it loses its ability to 
make rational and moral security political decisions. 
Material dependence in the cold war context 
The need for rational adaptation to asymmetric power relationship is based on a perceived material 
asymmetry. Such a perception is often based on the fact that the dependent nation has far less military 
resources than the big power and its economy has the potential for a much lesser contribution to the 
big nation than the potential contribution of the big power to the dependent nation. In addition to 
resource disparity, Finlandization was considered to have been a function of conscious choices that 
emphasize this asymmetry. In the military realm, emphasizing asymmetry could mean that the 
dependent nation offers bases and allows permanent stationing of troops on its territory. In the 
                                                                
8 Yan Xuetong, “From Keeping a Low Profile to Striving for Achievement,” Chinese Journal of International Politics 7, 
no. 2 (2014); Jinping Xi, “Let the Sense of Community of Common Destiny Take Deep Root in Neighbouring Countries,” 
October 24, 2013, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t1093870.shtml. 
9 Henry A. Kissinger, “Ukraine Must Be Bridge Between East And West,” Huffington Post, March 6, 2014, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/03/06/kissinger-ukraine_n_4912573.html; Richard Löwenthal, Vom Kalten Krieg 
Zur Ostpolitik (from Cold War to East Politics) (Stuttgart: Seewald, 1974). 
5 
 
economic realm, active overly submissive strategy would mean policies that isolate the dependent 
nation and make it dependent on trade with the neighboring big power. 
Finland's military dependence on the Soviet Union could be measured by a comparison between 
Soviet and Finnish military spending. However, since Finland and the Soviet Union already had had 
a war military spending did not tell as an accurate story of the military imbalance as did the result of 
the war. It is clear that the war showed the Soviet Union that Finnish military power was sufficient to 
cause a lot of damage and loss of lives and time to the Soviet Union. At the same time it also told the 
Finns that Soviet Union would eventually emerge victorious even if it was burdened by other 
adversaries on other fronts. 
Finland from 1944 to 1947 was a country monitored by the allied forces (in the form of a Soviet-
dominated surveillance commission), while from 1944 until 1956 Porkkala, a peninsula only 40 km 
from the capital city of Helsinki, was occupied by a Soviet military base. This meant that the first 
contracts and security practices between Finland and the Soviet Union emerged under considerable 
Soviet control over Finland.  
Yet, after the ending of the occupation of Porkkala in 1956 Finland did not allow Soviet troops on its 
territory, and the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance that lasted until the 
collapse of the Soviet Union lacked provisions for automatic assistance if Finland of the Soviet Union 
was under threat. Contractually, Finland was committed to let the Soviet Union help Finland’s defense 
in a case where a mutual enemy tried to attack the Soviet Union through the Finnish territory. 
Contractually such help was decided upon mutually in consultation between the two, but the political 
reality was of course that the Soviet Union could not wait behind its border if an enemy that was 
clearly stronger than Finland, was about to march through Finland against the Soviet Union. 
According to President Paasikivi, the original architect of Finland’s post-WWII foreign policies, “we 
will not allow an attack through our territory against the Soviet Union, and if we cannot defend against 
it alone, we will get help from the Soviet Union … the Soviet Union would under no circumstances 
wait for an enemy to cross Finland.”10  
The fact that the Soviet Union did not build automatic infrastructure (contracts and interoperability) 
to help this “mutual assistance” also helped Finland’s defense. Such infrastructure would have made 
Western alliance assume that the Finland’s territory would be a springboard of Soviet aggression. 
Mutual assistance was never actualized and only once, on October 30, 1961, did the Soviet Union 
demand consultations on joint defense against a common enemy with a clear insinuation that such a 
consultation.  
                                                                
10Leino, Kommunisti Sisäministerinä (Communist as the Minister of Internal Affairs)., 224. 
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As can be seen in Graph 111 Finland maintained a relatively low dependence on Soviet trade and a 
non-existent dependence on the Soviet investments. On average, during the Cold War, the Soviet 
Union’s share of Finnish exports was 17.8%. The Soviet Union was the source of 15.4% of Finland’s 
imports and 16.6% of Finland’s total foreign trade was with the Soviet Union. Yet, Finnish economy 
was naturally much smaller than that of the Soviet Union. At best, Finland’s exports were just over 
8% of Soviet exports and imports a bit over 6% of Soviet imports. Thus the scale of economics was 
very asymmetrical. However, Finland never allowed itself to be too dependent on trade with the 
Soviet Union, partly in order to avoid Soviet economic blackmail and partly to avoid its economic 
future being dependent on the success of the Soviet economy. There is no documentation of the 
conscious doctrine (already authored by the first post-war president, Juho Kusti Paasikivi) of not 
allowing Finland’s trade with Soviet Union to rise above 25% of Finland’s total foreign trade, but 
statistics give support to the rumor of the existence of such a conscious policy. 
In addition to military and economic dependence, political discourses could have lead Finland into a 
political dependence. While Finland’s contractual commitments did not bind it to the Soviet defensive 
strategy, the Soviet rhetoric and interpretation of the world occasionally made it difficult for Finland 
to stay outside the Soviet sphere. Part of the Soviet world view and interpretation of the world was 
the idea of bloc politics. Soviet leaders talked about peace-loving countries that were opposed to 
imperialists and neo-colonialists. It was difficult for Finland to find a neutral place in such a view of 
world politics. Active policies for peace were automatically associated with the Soviet camp, and 
thus, whenever Finland was trying to work for the long term goals of pacifying its region, it was easily 
assumed by the Soviet Union to be following the program of the peaceful countries against the 
                                                                
11 The data in the graph and in other trade data in this article is from “IMF eLibrary Data,” accessed February 13, 2015, 
http://elibrary-data.imf.org/. 
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imperialists. If peaceful initiatives were by definition associated with the Soviet camp, it was easy for 
the Soviet Union to claim defensive cooperation from Finland against threats to the peace-loving 
countries. For example, the Soviet Union assumed Finland’s help at the United Nations in the Berlin 
crisis, not because of its neighborly status, but because Finland had chosen to work for peace. 
According to Krushschev, as recorded by President Kekkonen on September 15, 1961, “It is truly 
incomprehensible that Finland abstains from voting when it is a question about proposals made by 
the Soviet Union for world peace and the security of small neutral countries… We had every right to 
expect support from Finland in the campaign to safeguard world peace.”12 
Autonomy and sovereignty in the cold war context 
According to President Kekkonen “The foreign policy of every nation naturally has to consider the 
defense and protection of independence as the main goal, but a country in the position of Finland has 
to be exceptionally careful in directing its attention to this question.”13 Yet, international security 
interests were seen as prior to the domestic interests,14 and thus those issues in which domestic and 
foreign policy questions were mixed were exceptionally difficult. Many concluded that the line 
between domestic and foreign policies was fluid and difficult to draw. It was like a line drawn on 
water.15 Claims of Finlandization or an overly soft attitude towards the Soviet Union often focused 
on alleged compromises Finland had made in issues that should have been considered domestic.16 
Finland was beneficial for the Soviet Union as a showcase of peaceful coexistence between countries 
of two different economic and political systems and, the Soviet Union did not want to, nor would 
Finland have accepted, any support for the Communist party in Finland’s domestic affairs as a result. 
Finland’s presidents during the time of Finlandization were both non-socialist. Paasikivi was affiliated 
with a liberal democratic party that now uses the name National Coalition Party, while Kekkonen 
belonged to a centrist agrarian party which is now known as the Center Party. Finland’s communist 
party was legal, but remained one of the smallest communist parties of Western Europe for most of 
its post-World War II history According to President Kekkonen’s own diary, he emphasized on 
September 4, 1960, in a speech at the Soviet Embassy “that Finland will remain “capitalist” Nordic 
democracy, even if all other states chose a communist path.”17 After the short period under the 
surveillance of the allied commission, communists were also rarely accepted by coalition cabinets. 
Communists were among the few parties that never participated in cabinets during the first decade of 
President Kekkonen’s rule (1956-1966). 
                                                                
12Kekkonen, Urho Kekkosen Päiväkirjat (Urho Kekkonen’s Diary), Part 1, 1958-62., 438. 
13Kekkonen, “Naapurisopu ‘Perivihollisen’ Kanssa (Neigborly Peace with an Archrival).  A Speech in Stockholm  on 
December 7, 1943.,” 122. 
14Urho K. Kekkonen, Kirjeitä Myllystäni (letters from My Mill). Part 2, 1968-1975. (Helsinki: Otava, 1976), 74. 
15Max Jakobson, Veteen piirretty viiva: havaintoja ja merkintöjä vuosilta 1953-1965 (A line drawn in water. Observations 
and memos from 1953-1965) (Helsinki: Otava, 1980). 
16Tuure Junnila, Jäädytetty Demokratia. (frozen Democracy) (Jyväskylä: Gummerus, 1960); Kare, Tähän on Tultu : 
Paasikiven Linjalta K-Rintamaan (This Is Where We Have Bocome. From the Paasikivi-Line to K-Line); Löwenthal, Vom 
Kalten Krieg Zur Ostpolitik (from Cold War to East Politics). 
17Kekkonen, Urho Kekkosen Päiväkirjat (Urho Kekkonen’s Diary), Part 1, 1958-62., 376. 
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The Soviet acceptance of Finland’s political system also meant restraints to Soviet contacts with 
Finnish communists (after the immediate post/war period). Ambassadors with ties with communist 
politicians were often called back to Moscow, since according to the Soviet interpretation, the 
promotion of communists would have constituted interference in internal affairs.18 Finnish 
communists were also domestically under strict surveillance for their ties to Moscow. Inappropriate 
ties to Moscow often ruled out the communist participation in Finnish cabinets.19 Furthermore, also 
Soviet leadership occasionally punished Finnish communists for trying to introduce Soviet influence 
in Finnish domestic politics.20 
While it was clear both to Finns and the Soviet leaders that support for communist conspirators would 
have constituted a breach of the Soviet respect for Finland’s independence, there was confusion and 
disagreement between Finns and the Soviet leaders about what constituted other types of intrusions 
on Finland’s sovereignty.  
The post-war political occupation of Finland by the allied commission created a precedent in which 
the Soviet Union was allowed to judge which of the Finnish politicians represented “a policy of 
aggression” and which did not. The allied commission demanded that seven of the main 
representatives of “the policy of anti-Soviet aggression” be tried and convicted of war crimes. Among 
these were the former president, Risto Ryti and the former prime minister, T.M. Kivimäki.21 Since 
Finland had several times before and during the Second World War allowed enemies of the Soviet 
union to use Finnish territory against Soviet Union, the Soviet leadership felt that it had the right to 
decide, which politicians were trustworthy in this commitment not to do this again.   
Still in 1972, President Kekkonen’s term as president was extended exceptionally by a parliamentary 
majority that was sufficient for a speedy exception to the constitution in order to enable Finland to 
join the EEC as an associate member, as the Soviet Union could see this as a friendly move only if it 
could have confidence in the foreign policy elite.22 The word “confidence” became the symbol of this 
mechanism of Soviet control. Where ever the Soviet Union used its economic power to influence 
Finland’s presidential elections or cabinet formation, the normative legitimacy of such exercise of 
power was based on the concept of confidence. “Confidence” was part of the agreed framework of 
the Fenno-Soviet relationship, and the Soviet Union did not have “confidence” in certain 
personalities. “Confidence” thus offered the Soviet Union a pathway to Finland’s domestic 
governance, and compromised Finland’s autonomy and democracy. 
                                                                
18Karjalainen and Tarkka, Presidentin Ministeri (president’s Minister)., 176. 
19Kekkonen, Urho Kekkosen Päiväkirjat (Urho Kekkonen’s Diary), Part 1, 1958-62., 458. 
20Ibid., 104. 
21 Prime Minister Paasikivi’s notes on the discussion on this can be found from his entries from January 23, 1945 onwards 
in Paasikivi, J K Paasikiven Päiväkirjat (Paasikivi’s Diary), Parts 1-2 (edited by Yrjö Blomstedt and Matti Klinge), 92–
6. 
22 A majority of 4/5 of the parliament was needed for such an exception to the constitution. The president was normally 
elected by people in an indirect election. The process of negotiation within the parliament is described by Lasse Lehtinen, 
one of the parliamentarians who voted in favor of the exception in Lasse Lehtinen, “Näin Kekkonen Junttasi Läpi 
Poikkeuslain (This Is How Kekkonen Bullied through the Constitutional Exception),” Helsingin Sanomat, August 10, 
2014.. 
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The lack of institutionalization of confidence meant that the entire relationship was tied to 
personalities. The Finnish foreign policy doctrine was called Paasikivi-Kekkonen line after the two 
personalities that made the greatest contribution to the strategy. This tied confidence to the policy to 
those figures. This personification of “trust” made it dangerous for Soviet “confidence” to go against 
these individuals in any political question.23 During the crisis of 1958 and 1961 in Finland’s 
relationship with the Soviet Union, all the challengers to Kekkonen in the formation of the cabinet 
(1958), and in the presidential election (1961) emphasized that they supported Finland’s current 
foreign policies,24 but opposed Kekkonen’s domestic power politics. Despite this, their challenge to 
the manager of foreign relations, President Kekkonen, was treated in the Soviet Union as challenge 
to the foreign policy direction. Opponents of the two presidents often interpreted this association as 
intentional.25 
On the other hand, the personification of “confidence” also made it possible for trusted Finnish 
political leaders to issue recommendations to the Soviet leaders on the trustworthiness of other 
politicians. This offered a devastating tool for trusted Finnish politicians to use against their political 
enemies.26 One of President Kekkonen’s political rivals, called this practice a “snitch campaign”.27   
It is not known how much the personification of confidence was intended by its Finnish beneficiaries, 
or how much Soviet leaders wanted to use it as a way to help their friends in the Finnish 
administration. It is likely that the personification of trust at least to some extent survived because of 
the personal interests of some Finnish politicians and because of the Soviet interest in keeping 
political leaders rewarded for being trustworthy. It was the main problem for Finland’s autonomy, 
however. Finland was vulnerable to the abuse of Soviet confidence as a political tool that could have 
risked Finland’s autonomy and democracy: “since foreign policy is primary to domestic policies, this 
means in my experience … that an inappropriate foreign policy also leads to the loss of influence in 
domestic and economic issues.”28 Thus, Soviet confidence could penetrate into all political spheres 
and exclude politicians from power whenever for some reason they were not trusted by Soviet leaders 
for their foreign policy ideas. In addition to politicians the Soviet “surveillance of confidence” was 
extended, at times, to the media, too. Whenever there were writings hostile to the Soviet Union, this 
was interpreted as evidence of the tendencies against good relations. Both Presidents Paasikivi and 
Kekkonen saw the role of the media as problematic and both occasionally exercised their power over 
                                                                
23Urho K. Kekkonen, “Rauhanomaisen Rinnakkaiselon Vaatimukset Ja Merkitys (The Requirements and Meaning of 
Peaceful Coexistence), Speech in Kokemäki, on August 28, 1955.,” in In Tuomas Vilkuna, Ed., Urho Kekkosen Puheita 
Ja Kirjoituksia (Speeches and Writings of Urho Kekkonen) 1, Puheita Vuosilta (Speeches from years)1936-1956. 
(Helsinki: Weiling & Göös, 1967), 357. 
24The foreign minister of the coalition cabinet that the Soviet Union started its passive resistance, for example, said 
according to President Kekkonen’s notes in the party congress that we will resign from the cabinet if it tries to change the 
foreign policy line an inch Kekkonen, Urho Kekkosen Päiväkirjat (Urho Kekkonen’s Diary), Part 1, 1958-62., 113.. 
Kekkonen’s challenge in the presidential election of 1961 similarly emphasized in his speeches that his foreign policy 
line was no different from that of Paasikivi See the memoirs of the presidential candidate in Olavi Honka, Muistelmia ja 
Mielipiteitä (memoirs and opinions) (Helsinki: WSOY, 1972).. 
25 Tuure Junnila, Jäädytetty Demokratia. (frozen Democracy) (Jyväskylä: Gummerus, 1960). 
26Karjalainen and Tarkka, Presidentin Ministeri (President’s Minister), 190. 
27Kekkonen, Urho Kekkosen Päiväkirjat (Urho Kekkonen’s Diary), Part 1, 1958-62., 376. 
28Kekkonen, Kirjeitä Myllystäni (letters from My Mill). Part 2, 1968-1975., 74. 
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the media.29 Although self-censorship in the media with relation to stories on the Soviet Union was 
limited to one aspect of Finland’s foreign policies, it was dangerous to democracy and even 
autonomy.30  
Rational adaptation in the cold war context   
According to Finland's president, Finland had to base its foreign policy on the realities of power: “The 
Soviet Union will remain a great power after this war. The fact [is] that this great power is our 
neighbor … we cannot do anything about it. These are the premises we have to base our conclusions 
on.”31  From this Kekkonen deduced that Finland has to work with the Soviet Union as it was too 
weak to oppose it. Working with powers hostile to the Soviet Union would not be an option as that 
would have made Finland the first battle ground for big powers. As Kekkonen said “It cannot be in 
the interests of Finland to be the last frontier of some great power (US/UK/Germany) at the Russian 
border. This way Finland would always have to be on alert and still it would be the first to be fed to 
the enemy (the Soviet Union).”32 Henry Kissinger’s warning to Ukraine repeats this logic almost word 
by word.33  
Finland’s unwillingness and inability to balance Soviet power militarily by relying on the power of 
the United States was a conscious choice that could be seen as rational adaptation: as long as the 
Soviet Union did not feel the US threat through Finland, it did not need to pull the country too close 
to its sphere of influence. The Soviet Union insisted on removing the danger of Finland being used 
militarily against it, while Finland wanted to interpret this as fully compatible with the idea of 
neutrality. If Finland was strong (but never strong enough to be threatening from the Soviet point of 
view) it could defend itself against an attack on the Soviet Union through Finland. If Finland did this 
all by itself, it would not be threatening to Nato either, as Finland alone could not be a sufficient force 
against the Western alliance. Thus, Finland could be a zone that promoted crisis stability as it was 
less provocative for Nato to start a countering defensive move in the vicinity of Finland’s borders if 
Finland was taking care of its own defense rather than being helped by the Soviet Union. As long as 
the Soviet Union did not intend to attack Nato through Finland, it was, therefore, actually better off 
if Finland was neutral than in the provocative setting in which Finland’s territory had Soviet military 
installations and bases. Similarly, it was useful for Nato forces not to come too close to the Finnish 
border so that the Soviet Union would not be provoked into “helping” Finland’s defense. During the 
Second World War, the Soviet Union had learned how its own right to cross Finland and use Western 
parts of the country as the far outposts of the Soviet defense had provoked Finland to allow similar 
rights to Germany (in Spring 1940, soon after the ending of the Winter War between Finland and the 
Soviet Union), and thus while promoting its offensive interests the Soviet Union had inadvertently 
harmed its defensive interests. 
                                                                
29Paasikivi, J K Paasikiven Päiväkirjat (Paasikivi’s Diary), Parts 1-2 (edited by Yrjö Blomstedt and Matti Klinge); 
Kekkonen, Urho Kekkosen Päiväkirjat (Urho Kekkonen’s Diary), Part 1, 1958-62. 
30Martti Valkonen, Suomettuminen Jatkuu Yhä (finlandization Continues Still) (Helsinki: Tammi, 1998). 
31Ibid., 131. 
32Ibid., 132. 
33 Henry A. Kissinger, “To Settle the Ukraine Crisis, Start at the End,” The Washington Post, March 5, 2014, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/henry-kissinger-to-settle-the-ukraine-crisis-start-at-the-
end/2014/03/05/46dad868-a496-11e3-8466-d34c451760b9_story.html. 
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 The Finnish adaptation strategy towards the Soviet Union was based on four premises: 
1. In an asymmetrical setting, the small power has to find a security strategy that takes into account 
the interests of the big power. President Kekkonen’s stand was that Finlandization had to be more 
useful for the Soviet Union than alliance with it or its occupation of Finland.34  
2. There is a difference between defensive and offensive security interests. The former is more 
important than the latter. In a structural setting, defensive interests are also compatible with the 
defensive interests of other countries. Thus Finland could be useful to the Soviet security interest 
without escalating tension in the Western camp (which was also in the interests of both Finland and 
the Soviet Union), only if Finland made a distinction between the Soviet defensive and offensive 
interests and attended to the former only. This is why Finland did not want to activate mutual defense 
assistance with the Soviet Union as this would have been interpreted as serving Soviet offensive 
interests as well. Kekkonen used the word “war psychosis” in his successful argument in 1961 against 
consultation on defense cooperation in his effort to explain to Krushschev why it was in the Soviet 
defensive interest not to insist on “assisting” Finland in the defense of its own territory.35     
3. Finland’s neutrality and especially its willingness to prevent its territory from being used in attacks 
on the Soviet Union (but also on the West) had to be trusted by the Soviet Union (as well as the West), 
before it could be useful for the defensive interests of the Soviet Union (and the West). Trust provided 
freedom for the development of Finland’s defense, and even to the rationale of buying defense-related 
hardware both from the Soviet Union and from the West.36   
4. Finland’s foreign policy wanted the Nordic countries of Europe to remain free of nuclear weapons 
primarily for two reasons. 37 
a. Finland’s strategy of making its search for security non-threatening and beneficial for 
the defensive security interests of other countries was based on the logic of conventional 
warfare, in which defensive interests could be served by preventing all countries from 
using one’s territory against another. However, the logic of stability in the nuclear 
weapons scenario was based on deterrence, in which physical defense was a threat as it 
could deny counter strike against the country that launched the first strike. This is why 
Finland’s adaptation strategy worked only if Nordic countries remained free of nuclear 
weapons.   
b. Furthermore, if Norway and Denmark were to receive US/Nato nuclear weapons this 
would create precisely the increased tension that Finland tried to prevent by means of 
                                                                
34 Urho K. Kekkonen, “Naapurisopu ‘Perivihollisen’ Kanssa (Neigborly Peace with an Archrival).  A Speech in Stockholm  
on December 7, 1943.,” in In Tuomas Vilkuna, Ed., Urho Kekkosen Puheita Ja Kirjoituksia (Speeches and Writings of 
Urho Kekkonen) 1, Puheita Vuosilta (Speeches from years)1936-1956. (Helsinki: Weiling & Göös, 1967), 127. 
35 Urho K. Kekkonen, Urho Kekkosen Päiväkirjat (Urho Kekkonen’s Diary), Part 1, 1958-62. (Helsinki: Otava, 2001), 
395. 
36 Ibid., 462. 
37 Urho K. Kekkonen and Yrjö Lautela, “Ydinaseeton Pohjola (Nuclear Weapon’s Free Zone in Northerrn Europe), 
Reportage on May 9, 1978, by the Yrjö Lautela of the Finnish Broadcasting Company of President Kekkonen’s Speech 
at Swedish Institute of International Affairs, in May 1978.,” Elävä Arkisto | YLE, 1978, 
http://yle.fi/elavaarkisto/artikkelit/ydinaseeton_pohjola_9950.html. 
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its neutrality. The benefit for the Soviet Union of not actively helping Finland’s defense 
was the fact that Nato was not provoked into the militarization of its areas near Finland.  
Material dependence on China 
Military asymmetry 
It would not be possible to rule whether Finland was too dependent on the Soviet Union to conduct 
rational policies, and thus it would neither be possible to define when East Asia could be too 
dependent on China. However, the fact that Finland was criticized for being too attentive and too 
dependent suggests that it was a border case. Therefore, comparison to Finland could be useful to 
determine when East Asia moves to the risk zone.  
Using military expenditure as means of measurement, we can see in Table 1 that with the exception 
of the Koreas and Japan all other East Asian countries are militarily as meaningless as Finland was 
in comparison to the Soviet Union. Exact percentages are not meaningful, as logistics and especially 
the relationship to (and interoperability with) the balancing forces of the United States is so much 
more meaningful for the military balance than percentages between 6% and 0%. 
Table 1. Military expenditure compared to PRC military 
expenditure, 2013 
  
Japan                          25.79% 
Korea, South                   18.01% 
Philippines                    1.84% 
Singapore                      5.18% 
Thailand                       3.13% 
Viet Nam                       1.80% 
 
Contractual arrangements also affect asymmetry, as they might make is easier to justify the use of 
military capabilities (in terms of appropriateness). When thinking of the possibility of China creating 
a similar asymmetry with any of its neighbors as the Soviet Union created in Finland, one has to 
remember that there is no recent history of Chinese occupation of its East Asian neighbors, and this 
must be significant for the practices of asymmetry in that region. Furthermore, China does not have 
institutional military access to its smaller neighboring countries even to the extent that the Soviet 
Union had to Finland. China has not formed military alliances nor has it requested permission to 
station military forces or conclude agreements on “mutual assistance”, except in North Korea. 
Furthermore, China’s neighbors have no institutional obstacles to balancing China’s power with the 
power of the US, while Finland could not seek alliances with forces hostile to the Soviet Union. 
Foreign policies of China's neighbors are not (yet) limited to a specific logic of peacefulness in the 
same way as the Soviet Union tried to limit Finland's security policies by attaching the label of 
“peacefulness” only to pro-Soviet initiatives. While China does consider itself peaceful, current 
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Chinese rhetoric does not associate peace with a bloc. Instead, China declares its opposition to bloc 
politics.38 Even though occasionally Chinese public debate neutralizes China’s positions of peace and 
justice as something all countries would need to concede (such as in the debate over the Chinese 
dream that was seen in several articles of the Peoples’ daily as necessary for the whole world), and 
even though China considers some of its specific positions as indisputable 39, China’s foreign policy 
rhetoric does not generally associate peace, justice or legality with its “own side”. Thus China had 
not prepared the military balance in a way that would force its neighbors into its own camp the way 
the Soviet Union did with Finland during the cold war. 
Finally, opportunities for military pressure in an asymmetrical relationship arise not only from the 
material strength, historically created patterns of interaction and practices or the existence of 
institutions and interpretations that make such pressure possible, but also from normative structures 
that reduce the costs of military pressure. While the Soviet Union had no legitimate and politically 
costless excuses for the use of military force against Finland (except if it misinterpreted the mutual 
assistance stipulation in the TFCMA), China has maritime territorial claims to Japan, Vietnam and 
the Philippines. Thus China does not need to find excuses because it can always refer to its right to 
“exercise sovereign control” in these areas. Thus it could be said that militarily China has more 
convenient ways of imposing its will on its neighbors in issues related to territorial disputes, despite 
the lack of formal military pacts. However, this perceived legitimacy of military influence is limited 
in Southeast Asia to the disputed maritime areas. It is conceivable that China will expand its de facto 
control to all the maritime areas it claims, but this does not really pose an existential threat to other 
claimants as these islands are generally not permanently inhabited by citizens of any of country. The 
military setting, and perhaps Chinese military objectives as well, do not seem ripe for Chinese 
dominance. China will have military superiority over its neighbors, but no institutional or normative 
access points to military pressure beyond its limited objectives in the maritime territories it claims.  
Economic Dependence 
Despite the lack of military pressure beyond the disputed maritime areas, it is clear that China has 
economic leverage over East Asian countries. As can be seen in Graph 2 (compare to Graph 1), 
China’s economic dominance is extensive even in countries that politically and militarily ally 
themselves with the United States. 
                                                                
38Jintao Hu, “Written Speech by H.E. Hu Jintao President of the People’s Republic of China At the High-Level Plenary 
Meeting of the United Nations’ 60th Session,” September 16, 2005, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/zyjh/t213091.htm. 
39 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, “China’s Indisputable Sovereignty Over Xisha And Nansha Islands,” Beijing 
Review 7 (February 18, 1980). 
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Chart 2 reveals that The Philippines and Vietnam are both much more dependent on Chinese export 
markets than Finland ever was on the Soviet Union. Furthermore, Japan is more dependent on the 
Chinese export market than Finland was on average on the Soviet export market, while South Korea 
is about as dependent as Finland was on average. Only Thailand and Singapore, of the East Asian 
balancers have remained less dependent on Chinese trade than Finland on the Soviet trade. The 
development of Singaporean and especially Thai trade, however, suggests, that it will not take long 
before both countries are at the same level as Finland was on average with the Soviet Union. For 
South Korea and Japan, dependence on China is mutual and thus it does not create a similar 
asymmetry as the one between Finland and the Soviet Union.  
However, if one looks at imports as well (see Graph 3), it is easy to see that even South Korea is much 
more dependent on trade with China than Finland was on the Soviet Union. One should note however, 
that while Japan, South Korea and ASEAN as a bloc are dependent on the Chinese economy, strong 
economic ties have also made China more dependent on these economies. While Finland’s trade never 
exceeded 10% of the value of the Soviet trade, the value of Japan’s trade is currently one third of 
Chinese trade, while the value of Korea’s trade is one fourth. Assuming that ASEAN can develop 
sufficient cohesion to bargain as a bloc, the dependence of East Asian balancers is not quite as 
extensive as national statistics suggest.  
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Material imbalance in dependency is not, however, the only thing that determines the risk of becoming 
forced to be attentive to the interests of China. Norms and rules about how economic leverage can be 
used are also very important. Whether it is diplomatically and politically very expensive or not to use 
economic coercion for political benefit makes a big difference. There is a great difference in such 
rules between China and the Soviet Union. 
As learned from the previous section, during the cold war, the Soviet Union actively tailored 
economic concessions to political compromises. China’s declaratory foreign policy, however, rejects 
the political conditionality of economic relations.40 This declaratory policy and practice makes it more 
costly for China to use economic pressure to gain political benefits. China’s economic asymmetry is 
thus less likely to push its neighbors into excessive concessions. Yet, the cohesion of the ASEAN is 
crucial to balance dependences in Southeast Asia and to make dependence interdependence: China 
can remain dependent on the ASEAN economy, but never on the economy of any of the single 
ASEAN country. 
The balancing nations could be divided into three categories on the basis of their dependence on 
China. On the one hand Singapore and Thailand are mostly dependent on the United States and not 
very much on China. Yet, it is clear that there is still an asymmetry in the relations between these 
countries on the one hand, and China, on the other. Only in issues where Thailand and Singapore can 
coordinate their bargaining with ASEAN, can they create more symmetrical power political 
relationships with China. Militarily, Thailand’s proximity to China can make balancing more difficult 
in the future, as the credibility of US ability to help Thailand in a military confrontation with China 
can become questionable. This way Thailand could be interested in listening to Kissinger’s analysis 
on geopolitical realities of even learning from Finland.  
                                                                
40James Reilly, “China’s Unilateral Sanctions,” The Washington Quarterly 35, no. 4 (2012): 121–33. 
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Secondly, South Korea and Japan, again are clearly very dependent both on the United States and 
China. Their dependence on China is greater as the dependence of Finland on the Soviet Union during 
the Second World War. However, they are both also quite dependent on the United States, while China 
is also very dependent on both countries. Since both are very central players in the East Asian security 
game, it would be important for both to learn about strategies that address the dangers of regional 
security dilemma formations. “Security dilemma sensitivity” would be important for both countries.41 
Since the strategy of Finlandization is one of the socially rational strategies in the context of a security 
dilemma, the lessons of Finlandization could be interesting also to these two nations.  
Thirdly, Vietnam and the Philippines are balancing nations that nevertheless are much more 
dependent on China than Finland ever was on Soviet Union, and generally almost as dependent on 
China as Mongolia, North Korea, Myanmar, Cambodia and Laos are. For these countries balancing 
is an option provoked by the perceived threat and power of China, but one that simultaneously 
provokes Chinese assertiveness. One could say that China’s assertiveness towards the Philippines and 
Vietnam on the one hand, and the Philippine and Vietnamese strategy of inviting greater military role 
of the United States mutually construct each other’s legitimacy. Thus, the relationship of the two 
countries with the rising China is a problematic one. Its social irrationality can be modeled as a 
security dilemma, and therefore, strategies like Finlandization that address the problems of security 
dilemma could be useful for Vietnam and the Philippines, as well as for China.  
Autonomy and sovereignty in the East Asian context 
The fact that not all China's neighbors are led by their communist parties creates a similarity between 
them and Finland. Support for communist rebellions was part of the doctrine of proletarian 
internationalism in China during the Cultural Revolution.42 At the end of the 1960s, China had no 
diplomatic relations with practically any country of importance for its security and trade. This was 
because the radical proletarian internationalist approach that pushed it to interpret international 
relations as class struggle rather than interaction between states. This class-interpretation made it 
difficult for China to respect the sovereignty of states, or even recognize states as meaningful actors 
in international relations.43 Furthermore, in the case of Indochina, China has had interests in rectifying 
the approach of Indochinese communist parties. One could imagine that this motive could in some 
cases be a domestic necessity given that to some extent the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist 
Party could be related the correct interpretation of the socialist ideas. However, after the adoption of 
the development-oriented role for the state, and after reaffirming China’s commitment to the norm of 
respecting the sovereignty of other countries, with some delay in Burma and in Vietnam-controlled 
Cambodia in the 1980s, China stopped its support of communist subversives and communist parties.44 
                                                                
41 The idea of socially rational strategizing in the context of security dilemma as security dilemma sensitivity is from 
Booth and Wheeler, The Security Dilemma; and Robert Jervis, “Was the Cold War a Security Dilemma?,” Journal of Cold 
War Studies 3, no. 1 (2001): 36–60. 
42 Philip Bridgham, “Mao’s Cultural Revolution in 1967: The Struggle to Seize Power,” The China Quarterly, no. 34 
(June 1972): 6–37. 
43Timo Kivimäki, The Long Peace of East Asia. (Farnham: Ashgate, 2014), Chapter 7. 
44 Xiaoping Deng, “Realize the Four Modernizations and Never Seek Hegemony,” May 7, 1978, 
http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/dengxiaoping/103389.htm. 
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Due to China’s strong critique of the Soviet social imperialism45, interference in the implementation 
of socialist policies has become difficult also in those countries where communist parties are in power. 
Yet, there is no normative consensus over how much and in what kind of situations and issues China 
could support leaders of other Southeast Asian countries without being considered to interfere in 
domestic power battles.  
In addition to supporting one’s own political system and governance, interference could also be 
motivated by other things. If, for example, China’s growth was seriously threatened by constrained 
access to oil and gas, one could only guess how much China would respect, its neighbors’ sovereign 
right to choose the market for its energy trade. China’s respect for the sovereignty of its developing 
economic partners has already been suspected in several countries (Reed & Correspondent, 2006; 
Verhoeven, 2014). Furthermore, although China now intends to respect the sovereignty of other 
nations, what guarantees that this approach will continue? During the Cultural Revolution, China was 
definitely not in compliance with the norm of respect for sovereignty as it exported communism and 
supported rebellious insurgents in several of its neighbors with the result that practically nobody 
wanted to work with China. Yet China had already first declared its commitment to respect for 
sovereignty in its five principles of 1954 (“Five Principles of Peaceful Cooperation,” 1954), while 
the Principles of Foreign Aid emphasize the same commitment to non-interference.46 
However, China declares that a relationship between itself and other countries is based on equality 
and common interest rather than the promotion or imposition of Chinese ideologies and models of 
domestic governance. Since the ending of the Cultural Revolution, China has reaffirmed its 
commitment to anti-hegemonism and this, in official Chinese parlance, has meant refraining from 
imposing Chinese ideas relating to domestic administration on other countries.47 In 2004, President 
Hu Jintao announced what he referred to as the “Four No’s”. The first “No” was no to hegemony.48 
The doctrine of peaceful rise also simply involves convincing others of the usefulness of mutually 
beneficial economic state-to-state cooperation with China, without any Chinese interference in the 
domestic policies of other countries.49 
Yet declarations do not always matter as Finland saw in its relationship with the Soviet Union. Despite 
its declarations, the practice of China’s respect for sovereignty could be different in the future. 
Verhoeven claims that “While Chinese government officials still piously align their rhetoric to this 
cardinal principle of post-1949 diplomacy, it is increasingly clear that Beijing is de facto gradually 
                                                                
45 Zhedong Mao, On Khrushchov’s Phoney Communism and Its Historical Lessons for the World. Comment on the Open 
Letter of the Central Committee of the CPSU (IX) (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1964), 
http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/works/1964/phnycom.htm. 
46Zhou Enlai, “Zhou Enlai Announces Eight Principles of Foreign Aid,” 1964, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010-
08/13/content_11149131.htm. 
47Xiaoping Deng, “We Shall Concentrate On Economic Development. September 18, 1982.,” Talk With Kim I1 Sung, 
General Secretary Of The Central Committee Of The Korean Workers’ Party. Available at 
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/dengxp/vol3/text/c1030.html., 1982; ibid. 
48Giovanni Arrighi, Adam Smith in Beijing. (London: Verso, 2008). 
49Jaewoo Choo, “Ideas Matter: China’s Peaceful Rise,” Asia Europe Journal 7, no. 3–4 (December 1, 2009): 389–404, 
doi:10.1007/s10308-009-0241-3; “Full Text: China’s Peaceful Development,” 2011, http://english.gov.cn/official/2011-
09/06/content_1941354.htm; Jianyong Yue, “Peaceful Rise of China: Myth or Reality?,” International Politics 45, no. 4 
(July 2008): 439–56, doi:10.1057/ip.2008.13. 
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abandoning its commitment to not interfering in the domestic politics of African states.”50 He does 
admit however that Chinese influence in domestic political systems is not similar to that of the 
Western powers. Tiejun explains the difference by claiming that while Western powers use their own 
value systems to judge what is “good governance” that has to be supported, China talks about 
“efficient governance” that allows the country itself to define the direction, while China simply 
supports efficiency in achieving the goals the country sets, assuming they are mutually beneficial.51 
Very often, however, efficiency is supported simply in governance that is related to country’s 
economic cooperation with China. In this respect, the policy might be selfish (in the promotion of 
mutual gains), but perhaps not hegemonic or intrusive into the domestic politics of neighboring 
countries. 
Nevertheless, selfishness could also yield hegemonic practices in specific situations. When domestic 
groups in economically important (energy producing) countries have had programs that go against 
Chinese economic interests or when there have been domestic groups that are against China’s 
unification with Taiwan, China has been tempted to interfere in domestic power battles. Barma claims 
that China prefers Myanmar and Zimbabwe to remain autocratic in order to avoid competition from 
the West in these countries.52 Furthermore, Kurlantzick claims, referring to a Singaporean diplomatic 
source, that China’s ambassador to Zambia had warned people against voting for the opposition, 
which mobilized people in demonstrations against poor labor conditions in Chinese companies in 
Zambia.53 It is clear that if a Singaporean diplomat views such developments with concern, countries 
in the immediate Chinese military sphere of influence such as Thailand and Vietnam but also the 
Philippines and South Korea see the emergence of such interference as worrying. Yet, Chinese 
violations of sovereignty (for example, in Zambia) have so far been very limited and since they are 
based on self-interest rather than some ideological justification, it is likely that they can be contained 
by the fact that disrespecting sovereignty would entail costs to China’s soft power.  
The violation of sovereignty goes against the soft power effort of China to make its neighbors “work 
with” it rather than working against it. This interest is likely to remain more important than the 
sporadic gains China can achieve by temporarily abandoning the norm of respecting sovereignty. The 
credibility of China’s effort to attract neighboring countries to work with it is largely based on these 
declarations of anti-hegemonism, and this has emphasized the cost of deviating from this line.54 
                                                                
50Harry Verhoeven, “Is Beijing’s Non-Interference Policy History? How Africa Is Changing China,” The Washington 
Quarterly 37, no. 2 (2014): 56, doi:10.1080/0163660X.2014.926209. 
51Tiejun Zhang, “Sino-European Relations: From the Height to the Width,” in In Bart Gaens, Juha Jokela and Eija 
Limnell, Eds., The Role of the European Union in Asia., The International Political Economy of New Regionalisms Series 
(Farnham: Ashgate, 2009), 121–38. 
52Nazneen Barma, “Chinese Illiberalism,” Democracy, no. 2 (2006): 56–68. 
53Joshua Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive. How China’s Soft Power Is Transforming the World. (New Haven and London: 
Yale University Press, 2007), 140. 
54Jinping Xi, “Work Together to Maintain World Peace and Security. Address by Vice President Xi Jinping of the People’s 
Republic of China At the Opening Ceremony of the World Peace Forum.” (Ministry of Foreign Affair of the People’s 
Republic of China, July 7, 2012), http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/wshd/t951973.htm; Jinping Xi, “Let the Sense of 
Community of Common Destiny Take Deep Root in Neighbouring Countries,” October 24, 2013, 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t1093870.shtml; Yan Xuetong, “From Keeping a Low Profile to Striving for 
Achievement,” Chinese Journal of International Politics 7, no. 2 (2014). 
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Finally, the association of Chinese international identity with anti-hegemonism has also made 
domestic interference politically costly. 
However the main problems of autonomy are perhaps not related to “Chinese economic imperialism” 
or efforts to help China-friendly economic policies by means of interference in domestic affairs. On 
the one hand, the main problems could be related, as was the case with Finland, to cases where foreign 
policy and domestic politics mix and thus confuses the normative consensus. When a Prime Minister 
of Japan visits a shrine or when a country’s ministry of education makes decisions on school books, 
we are talking about domestic decisions. However, if the shrine happens to be Yasukuni Shrine that 
houses lists the names of enshrined fatalities of nation’s war efforts and includes the names of 1,068 
enshrined war criminals, including 14 of whom are considered so-called A-Class criminals, the 
domestic issue also involves foreign policy concerns. When a Prime Minister pays respects to the 
memory of serious war criminals, like several Japanese Prime Ministers (Takeo Miki, Jasuhiro 
Nakasone, Ryutaro Hashimoto, Junichiro Koizumi and Shinzo Abe) have done since 1975, this could 
be interpreted constituting support for human rights violations and violations against the sovereignty 
and integrity of other countries. Could the use of economic, let alone military power, to persuade the 
Prime Minister not to go to this shrine then be considered a violation of the sovereign autonomy and 
interference in domestic affairs? Could Japan claim to respect for China’s defensive interests the way 
it would need to in order to avoid a spiral of escalation in the context of security dilemma, if at the 
same time Japanese Prime Minister paid respect to war criminals who had not only invaded China, 
but also violated the interests of the humanity regarding the treatment of human beings? If security 
dilemma sensitivity requires a certain respect for defensive interests of other countries, it would seem 
that ritual behavior of prime ministers would have to signal such respect, just as national educational 
policy should. Certainly in Cold War Finland, this would have been the interpretation. At the same 
time, the problem is that we do not know how ritual acts should be interpreted, and who should do 
the interpretation. Do the visits by prime ministers to Yasukuni Shrine really constitute support of war 
crimes or do they simply signify respect by the political leaders of a state to people who have 
sacrificed their lives for that state? There is no objective answer to this, but instead, the answer needs 
to be agreed upon in a dialogue between Japan and China. Learning from Finland’s experience, the 
clarity of that answer could be crucial. Normative clarity could deny the justification for interference 
in domestic politics, but also the disrespect of other countries’ defensive security interests. Whether 
a prime minister should visit a shrine is not, however, the only issue where normative clarity is 
needed. There are a number of issues that would need to be resolved in dialogue. Is China, for 
example, allowed to support a government in its fight against those rebel groups that with their combat 
operations risk the safety of the pipeline? Furthermore, is China allowed to support government 
against its democratic opposition that demands the government to abandon unpopular infrastructure 
contracts with China?  In general, rules are unclear, and some of the handlings of Chinese support to 
regimes takes place in secrecy. All this threatens the autonomy of China’s neighbors, but also the 
respect China’s neighbors have for China’s defensive security interests.  
What is secret cannot be known. This is why it is difficult to say how much sovereign autonomy of 
China’s neighbors has or will be compromised by secret dealings. The Finnish experience (and leaked 
secretes) suggests that secret dealings often compromise countries’ sovereign autonomy. Chinese 
diplomacy is sometimes rather secretive, and this offers opportunities for China to secretly exert 
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political concessions in exchange for economic cooperation. The political costs of economic coercion 
for China will be limited to the bilateral relationship between China and the coerced country since 
others will not know about it. Whatever happens secretly and remains secret will not have political 
costs. There is a rumor (that this article cannot verify or falsify) that the Philippine acceptance of 
forming a joint cooperation zone in the South China Sea in 2005 and the Vietnamese joining the 
scheme were caused by economic pressure from China.55  Both countries had previously committed 
to treating territorial disputes in the South China Sea as collective ASEAN matters. Although this has 
been useful as collective bargaining against China has increased the leverage of the ASEAN countries, 
both Vietnam and the Philippines went against their previous commitments here even if this then 
weakened the joint ASEAN stand to the degree that later enabled the Cambodian rejection in the 21st 
ASEAN Summit in Pnom Penh in November 2012 of treating Chinese assertiveness collectively.56  
In addition to the problems of secrecy and unclear normative regime of neighborly cooperation, some 
of China’s neighbors have further problems. China cannot convince Japan, Vietnam and the 
Philippines of its anti-hegemonism and respect for sovereignty fully as it claims parts of the territory 
these countries consider their own. These territories constitute a special problem in the Sino-ASEAN 
relationship, one that undoubtedly complicates the norm of respect of equal sovereignty in Southeast 
Asia.  
Rational adaptation in the ASEAN context 
At the core of Finland’s rational adaptation strategy was an attempt to avoid aiding big powers with 
their offensive military capacity. This has addressed the security dilemma by minimizing the risk of 
the fear for each other of great powers escalating tension and smaller conflicts into wars. In this 
respect the strategy of East Asia has not been very different. Before the adoption of the relatively 
similar strategy about two-thirds of conflict fatalities in East Asia after the Second World War were 
from internal conflicts that external military capacity escalated into wars.  External military capacity 
intensified conflicts on average by 95% if intensity is calculated on the basis of battle deaths per 
month.57 Since the Guam Doctrine and the post-Vietnam War fatigue, the United States has been 
unwilling to “do Southeast Asian wars by itself”.58 Furthermore, since the ending of the Cultural 
Revolution in China and the reduced intensity of Soviet subversion in East Asia, support for military 
capacity targeted against a East Asian government has declined drastically. Conflicts have not been 
escalated as external forces have not been allowed to use East Asian territories against regional 
governments. Largely as a result of, this the number of annual average battle deaths in East Asia has 
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declined by 95%.59  While national defensive capacity has grown, none of the nations in the region 
have managed to develop capabilities that could seriously threaten others, after the United States, the 
Soviet Union and other external big powers have been unwilling to interfere and prevented from 
entering in regional conflicts the way they did during the conflicts in Korea and Indochina.  
However, rational adaptation in Finlandization also involves a geopolitical element. In areas where 
geography makes one big power more prominent than all others, small countries should aim at 
accommodating that big power’s defensive security interests. At the same time they should try to 
make it beneficial for the neighboring big power to refrain from using small powers for the expansion 
of big power’s offensive military capacity. Of the East Asian countries the ones that emphasize the 
need to recognize China’s defensive interests most in their defense posture are North Korea, 
Mongolia, Myanmar, Cambodia and Laos. Furthermore, countries further away from China, such as 
Malaysia, Brunei and perhaps also Indonesia do not pose any offensive threats to China as they do 
not offer the US any additional capacity that China could perceive an offensive threat. Since none of 
these countries neither offer China their territories or powers for anything that East Asian neighbors 
or the United States could perceive as offensive, it would be possible to claim that these countries are 
security dilemma sensitive in Robert Jervis’ sense:60 none of them seriously threaten others in their 
own efforts to safeguard their own security.  
However, the approach of the balancers is different. Japan, South Korea, The Philippines, Thailand 
and Singapore have chosen a strategy that is explicitly against the logic of Finlandization. These 
nations balance Chinese power with the power of the opposing great power by engaging in military 
cooperation with the United States. Furthermore, in maritime territorial disputes also Vietnam 
occasionally uses US power to balance the push from China. It is clear that this balancing provokes 
Chinese counter reaction and is in that sense not an optimal strategy to tackle the regional security 
dilemma. However, one should not analyze the strategies of US allies in isolation of the Chinese 
strategies as the nature of security dilemma cannot be revealed in absence of sensitivity to interactive 
dialectical processes.  
The search for an external balancer in East Asia is clearly provoked by Chinese assertiveness in the 
maritime disputes. Japanese61, South Korean62, Vietnamese63 and Philippine 64 statements as well as 
US statements65 testify to this dialectical relationship over time.66 Furthermore, China occasionally 
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pushes ASEAN to refrain from a common stand on issues where China can then utilize the complete 
asymmetry of relations between itself and individual ASEAN countries. The way in which ASEAN 
failed to issue a communique from its Cambodia summit in 2012 testified how politically detrimental 
it is for the Sino-ASEAN relationship if ASEAN countries perceive that China tries to persuade small, 
dependent ASEAN countries not to accept a common stand on issues on which ASEAN interests are 
at odds with China’s.  
Security dilemma in Southeast Asia is not, however, just a function of external involvement. Due to 
the rise of Chinese military power, dependent neighboring countries could perceive their security 
situation deteriorated by this regional development and this could trigger a security dilemma. Even 
if, for example, the capacity of Vietnam to defend itself cannot threaten the security of the Philippines 
it is still possible that military capacity that countries consider purely for their own defense constitutes 
an offensive threat as the proponents of the security dilemma theorize.67 The asymmetry caused by 
the rise of Chinese economic and military capacity creates a special problem, since rising China will 
have capacity to destroy the defenses of most countries in the region. This is another reason why 
several countries, but perhaps more clearly the Philippines and Vietnam are strengthening their ties 
with the United States. The invitation of the United States military presence – by the Philippines with 
its new military bases agreement  and by Japan with its government’s efforts to allow a new American 
base on Okinawa Island and with its new interpretation of the constitutional article 9 allowing Japan 
to exercise “collective self-defense”  – goes against the 35-year old formula for regional security in 
the long peace of East Asia. Thus the debate on how to ensure that East Asia will not relapse into its 
pre-1979 violence and security dilemma perhaps also needs input from the debate on Finlandization. 
In a situation where a small country is geographically closer to one of the great powers, but unwilling 
to provoke regional security dilemma by offering its territory or resources to the support of the nearby 
great power, there is a need for arrangements that emphasize the difference between offensive and 
defensive interests. These arrangements become possible only if there is full respect for the defensive 
interests of the nearby great power, but also if the arrangement allows the small powers structural and 
discoursive tools for resisting political and economic pressure of, and dependence on the nearby great 
power. In Finland this was done by committing Finland into defense of its territories against enemies 
of the Soviet Union, but yet refraining from giving the Soviet Union power that could be considered 
as offensive by the NATO. At the same time, Finland engaged in Western European political and 
economic cooperation and became a showcase of the benefits of good relations with the Soviet Union.  
In East Asia, China has not requested defensive arrangements except for in Korea. Only North Korea 
has formalized defense ties with China in the Sino-North Korean Mutual Aid and Cooperation 
Friendship Treaty of 1961 which, even without an extension (which is likely to happen), will be in 
force until 2021. This treaty has an automatic mechanism for mutual assistance in North Korea, and 
in this sense it is not an agreement that allows North Korea any neutrality or contribution to crisis 
stability. From the point of view of South Korea this could be problematic if South Korea’s relations 
with China deteriorate. Thus this is a context that has to be taken into account when assessing security 
dilemma sensitivity of South Korean balancing strategy. To some extent the danger South Korea 
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causes to North Korea (and China) by hosting US military bases and conducting military exercises in 
the region is in an interactive, mutually constituting relationship with the North Korean defense 
arrangement with China. The North Korean military agreement with China does not alleviate the fears 
of South Korea that North Korean military force could be used against it. At the same time, the 
counter-force that South Korea seeks, increasingly from the US and from the consolidating trilateral 
cooperation with Japan, the US and South Korea does nothing to alleviate North Korean or Chinese 
fears. With Chinese support North Korea could unify the country on its own terms and this forces 
South Korea to seek assistance from the US for its own defense. North Korea’s nuclear program, too, 
emphasizes this need. This way not only Chinese assertiveness in the maritime territorial disputes, 
but also the military relationship of North Korea and China, as well as North Korea’s nuclear potential 
provoke South Korea to balancing that then again requires counter-balancing from North Korea and 
China.  
Elsewhere such arrangements have not been initiated. This has made it easier for the region to avoid 
a situation where East Asian countries could be seen as springboard of Chinese aggression. 
Normatively, there is an opportunity that East Asian countries could use the Chinese anti-hegemonist 
commitment and identity as a political shield against interventionism, just as Finland used its position 
as a show window of peaceful coexistence with the Soviet Union. However, the fact that China and 
several East Asian countries have maritime territorial disputes partly incapacitates this strategy, as it 
would be normatively possible for an anti-hegemonic China to use force within a territory it considers 
its own. Thus, while the benefits China gains from its anti-hegemonic identity and image can make 
interventionism less likely, in the disputed areas Japan, Vietnam and the Philippines are normatively 
defenseless.  
For Thailand, Singapore, Vietnam and the Philippines, however, there is a political adaptation strategy 
that they could use more effectively than Finland was able to. While Finland could not mobilize 
Finnish association with the European Free Trade Area in support of anything else than economic 
issues, Southeast Asian countries have the political association of ASEAN that can be used in political 
bargaining with China.  
Conclusions 
 
Finland's experience of material asymmetry with the Soviet Union suggests that good relations 
between China and its balancing neighbors should avoid extreme dependence of neighboring 
countries on China. On the contrary, good relations would be easier to maintain if there were limits 
to the degree on which China's neighbors are dependent on China. Even if geopolitical adaptation 
would require from neighboring countries (or at least some of them) hesitance towards balancing 
military relationships, East Asia should continue to engage economically and politically with the 
United States, Europe and other politically and economically balancing powers. This could help 
guarantee East Asia’s autonomy and rational adaptation strategies and avoid the destructive logic of 
security dilemma. 
Good trade and investment relations are naturally mutually useful and the potential for mutual benefit 
in East Asia is vastly greater than it was between Finland and the Soviet Union. However, there are 
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ways of making this relationship of dependence more equal and thus psychologically more 
sustainable. For Japan and South Korea dependence on China is not a great problem as China is also 
dependent on Japan and South Korea. However, for Vietnam, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand 
the situation is different. While it would be economically unwise to reduce trade and investment 
between China and these countries, it would be important to make the relationship of dependence 
more equal. This could be done by developing multilateralism in Chinese economic and political 
relations with ASEAN and by allowing ASEAN to negotiate with China as a group. By these means 
dependence on each other could be more symmetrical than in a situation where China dealt with each 
ASEAN country separately. This way there would be fewer political reasons for ASEAN countries 
either to seek balancing of the Chinese power with US help, or for reducing their individual 
dependence on the Chinese economy. 
If ASEAN could bargain on political differences with China as a group, this would enable it to 
legitimize its growing economic engagement with China. Dependence in the context of 
interdependence is not detrimental for the Southeast Asian region, while asymmetrical dependence 
would be. For China, negotiating with the ASEAN as a group, including issues where China has 
previously wanted to bargain from the position of strength, may be the only way of avoiding Thailand, 
Singapore, Vietnam and the Philippines from limiting economic interaction for political reasons, or 
continuing to resort to the US counterbalance in order to avoid an overwhelming asymmetry in the 
relationship with China. Showing that China does not intend to dominate Southeast Asia and does not 
mind dealing with ASEAN as a group could be a soft power strategy that ensured continuing growth 
of mutually beneficial economic interaction between China and ASEAN. This is at least in line with 
the declared Chinese objectives in the region,  and would be consistent with the adaptive logic of 
prioritizing defensive interests (mutually beneficial trade, defensive security) at the cost of offensive 
ones (domineering and offensive power play). 
This article has shown the weakness of the Finnish strategy in relation to Finland's ability to defend 
its sovereignty, autonomy and democracy. The first reason for the Finnish failure was related to the 
lack of clarity on what was meant by interference in domestic affairs. The Soviet Union often felt that 
it did not interfere in Finland’s domestic matters if it did not force Finland to follow the socialist 
course or if it did not support Finnish communists to gain power in Finland. However, for most of the 
critics of Finlandization and in fact for the Finnish leaders, the fact that the Soviet leaders felt they 
could use veto powers and block the access to power of politicians it did not have confidence with, 
was a limitation to Finland’s full independence. To avoid compromises to sovereignty and autonomy, 
East Asia should begin a debate on what the commonly accepted norm of respect for sovereignty 
could mean in the context of China’s rise. Would sovereignty mean the right to take an independent 
stand towards the Dalai Lama, Taiwan and Falun Gong? Would, for example visits by state officials 
to Yasukuni Shrine, or schoolbooks that China considers historically inaccurate and negative towards 
China be defined as expressions of independence and autonomy or would they be seen as disrespect 
towards China’s defensive security interests. And if supporting Dalai Lama, for example, by a leader 
of an East Asian country was considered inappropriate and disrespectful of China’s defensive 
interests, would this also mean that East Asian media, too, should refrain from such positions. Would 
it imply that China could simply refuse to have confidence in political personalities in neighboring 
countries, or would it mean that politicians would be treated in accordance with their institutional 
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positions? Since China needs good will as President Xi Jinping has declared, it would be a good time 
now to clarify the rules between states in the context of power asymmetry. China has defined its 
dreams 68 and China has invited other countries to react to the Chinese Dream. It would probably be 
a good idea for China’s East Asian neighbors to start defining their own dream and initiate a dialogue 
on the norms that China’s neighbors expect China to respect. Only by seeking normative consensus 
on how China should respect the independence of East Asian countries could East Asian relations 
create normative costs for unfair treatment.  
Institutionalization could also help avoid dangers to the full autonomy of East Asian countries at the 
wake of Chinese rise. Finnish foreign policy doctrine was conceptually linked to personalities rather 
than institutions or concrete defensive arrangements that could have guaranteed the trustworthiness. 
The Soviet Union could utilize this in a way that compromised Finland’s autonomy while Finnish 
politicians could utilize this to their personal political benefit in a way that compromised Finland’s 
independence and democracy. Learning from this East Asia and China should build their trust by 
using the instruments of “costly signaling” and institutional binding of their own hands as has been 
suggested in the theories of some of the leading rationalists in international relations studies.69 For 
East Asia, this has a special relevance. Track-two and track 1.5 diplomacy has been tremendously 
successful in East Asia. However, it has been based on personal relationships and trust between 
individuals. This, in the new emerging setting of asymmetry, could be dangerous as the example of 
Finland suggests. The rumors about secret deals related to the ASEAN summit of 2012 and the rumors 
about deals between Chinese politicians and the former president of the Philippines on the issue of 
joint development suggest that also in East Asia, secrecy and lack of transparency could sometimes 
compromise national interests and autonomy (there is the potential even if we judge these rumors 
false). Thus, the current strong emphasis in the Chinese as well as East Asian governments on 
transparency and measures to counter corruption should be extended to the relationship between East 
Asian countries and China. In addition to good personal relations and innovative interaction for the 
development of new security solutions and concepts, East Asia should find ways of building solid 
institutional relations as obstacles against violations of sovereignty.  
East Asia could consolidate its autonomy also by strengthening the commitment of Chinese 
declarations. Anti-hegemonism, for example, is easier for China to abandon if neighboring countries 
do not acknowledge the policy in a positive manner. By positively acknowledging Chinese anti-
hegemonism, East Asia could, just as Finland did in its show-window role, entrap China in its anti-
hegemonism politically and by helping China make it a corner-stone of neighborhood policies in East 
Asia. Once the rules of non-interference were very clear and embedded in the relationship, it would 
be difficult to change them without China losing face and harming its image.  
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Booth and Wheeler also theorize the possibility of basing commitment to norms and regimes on 
something they call “embedded trust”, in which friendship not just between leaders but between 
societies makes violent abuse of that trust unimaginable.70 While this was not possible for Finland 
due to the closed political system of the Soviet Union, it could surely be possible in the relations 
between China and its neighbors. Embedded trust is more than just an agreement, which can be 
changed when new leaders emerge. It is society-based and thus more durable. If Sino-East Asian 
cooperation is mutually beneficial it can also be nurtured by means of a people-to-people relationship. 
While East Asia could learn from the mistakes of Finland with regard to their autonomy and 
democracy, Finland’s “rational adaptation” in the Finnish strategy of “security dilemma sensibility”71 
could be something especially East Asian balancers could learn from. Conventional security 
strategies, such as balancing, tend to be insensitive of the effects country’s search for security has on 
the security of other countries. In an asymmetrical relationship, this often means that countries 
adjoining great powers either unite with the great power and lose their autonomy and become its 
outposts of against its enemies, or seek a balance from the opposing great power and become outposts 
of a distant power against a nearby great power. However, as Henry Kissinger has suggested, it is not 
good for the security of a country to be “either side’s outpost against the other.”  Both of these 
strategies entangle the small power in conflicts between great powers in a way that is harmful for the 
security of the small power.72 Finland’s strategy assumed the priority of defensive interests over 
offensive and sought attentiveness to the defensive (legitimate) security interests of the neighboring 
great power in a way that did not provoke the great powers opposed to the nearby power. Finland 
aimed at credible neutrality that could ensure its full intention and relative capacity to prevent any 
attacks by any nation against another nation through its territory. Finland’s territorial integrity thus 
became useful both for the Soviet Union and the West. 
East Asia’s original global strategy reflect similar type of neutral inclinations. However, cold war 
history as well as the new increasing assertiveness of China have pushed some of the East Asian 
countries closer to a balancing strategy. For Thailand this balancing has historical reasons that could 
have become increasingly unwise from the point of view of regional crisis stability and security 
dilemma sensitivity. However, for the Japan, South Korea, the Philippines and Vietnam, as well as 
partly for Singapore, balancing can only be understood as part of an interactive escalating processes 
that mostly relate to the territorial disputes in the South and East China Sea. Letting territories which 
are mostly uninhabited become an issue that invites external balancing and the risk of escalation does 
not seem rational for China any more than it is for Japan, Vietnam or the Philippines. Either it would 
be useful to fully postpone the settlement of the territorial disputes and to stick to the non-provocative 
principles of the Declaration of the Code of Conduct, or China and East Asia should finally aim to 
resolve the issue by means of negotiation. Both options should involve de-escalation and an adaptive 
strategy that is more security dilemma sensible, defensive and non-provocative. 
In absence of an effective shelving or resolving of the territorial disputes it would be important to de-
escalate the tension and counter the temptation to seek US military balancing. This could be done by 
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evening the asymmetry between ASEAN countries and China by allowing ASEAN to negotiate on 
territorial disputes with China as a bloc. Allowing ASEAN a common stand in Sino-ASEAN policies 
could also be a crucial proof of China’s anti-hegemonic stand, and an essential political concession 
for the goodwill needed for regional security community in Southeast Asia. 
A rational adaptive strategy for the Korean peninsula could start from the premise that the formula 
should serve both the defensive interests of China and the United States. The North Korean treaty 
with China does not need to offer China access to offensive cooperation with North Korea as it 
currently does. There could be similar limitations with regard to interoperability and hardware that 
would more clearly focus on the protection of the territory against an external attack. To offer long-
term security, it should be as much based on North Korean defensive power as cooperative military 
capacity.  
Similarly, instead of offering just any kind of military help (let alone US military bases), the South 
Korean alliance could be based on serving only the defensive interests of both countries. The idea 
would be to emphasize that the security of the Koreas as well as the security of the United States and 
China are interrelated, and thus the two sides of the Koreas must cooperate with their great power 
protectors in a way that takes the others’ defensive interests into account instead of being insensitive 
to the logic of the security dilemma. To make this security complex politically feasible, China must 
apply these measures to ensure its respect for the autonomous sovereignty of the two Koreas, while 
the United States needs to respect both the autonomy of its military ally and that of North Korea. It 
is not possible to build a stable adaptive structure of peaceful coexistence unless the international 
system operates at the level of the international system only, instead of mixing agendas of domestic 
regime change up with international interaction.  
The Korean peninsula also has a special problem with nuclear weapons. This has been tackled by 
means of deterrence and pressure in that North Korea has tried to deter Western efforts at regime 
change by means of nuclear armament. Meanwhile the West has tried to persuade North Korea to 
abandon its nuclear weapons program by exerting pressure and by trying to work for a regime change. 
Scholars of nuclear armament and disarmament tend to agree however that increasing security threats 
do not help a decision to abandon a nuclear weapons program . In addition to national pride, nuclear 
weapons are acquired for the deterrence against external threat, and thus increased threat increases 
the likelihood of the nuclear strategy being chosen.73  Removing nuclear weapons from the peninsula 
would enable the conventional adaptive logic in the region. Furthermore, it would clearly serve the 
defensive interests of the regional powers as can be seen in the support for this idea over the years.  
The escalatory logic of deterrence should just be reversed and security dilemma sensitivity should be 
developed by implementing security measures that would be beneficial for the defensive interests of 
others as well. 
For Korea, rational adaptation would mean a turn from deterrence and pressure based policies to the 
realization that each of the state actors in the Korean peninsula deserve recognition and autonomy 
and that such recognition should come with the effort to avoid one’s own need for security harming 
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the defensive interests of others. Both South Korea’s relationship with the US and North Korea’s 
relationship with China should be modified to avoid them serving offensive interests. 
This article should be seen as a “provocation” and the first step in a long journey in the development 
of better security concepts for East Asia where countries will have to adapt to the rise of China. The 
intention has not been to impose lessons from entirely different historical, political and cultural 
contexts onto others. In addition to contextual differences, security issues are also specific to the 
political values countries wish to secure, which is why one should not accept an analysis by a Finn of 
the ways of adapting to asymmetry in East Asia. Instead, this article is intended to reconstruct a 
consistent adaptation strategy and follow it in the analysis of a different security context. Since 
prescriptions in this article have been derived from the ideological and strategic logic of another time 
and place, they are prescriptive only within a logic that the reader does not need to accept. The main 
contribution this article offers to the East Asian debate has been the explication of the original concept 
of Finlandization and the translation of the model in a way that is historically accurate and relevant 
for Asia. The application of this reconstruction, again, has been more speculative, while the 
prescriptions for East Asian balancers have been intentionally wild and provocative. Nevertheless, I 
have felt that these prescriptions are useful because East Asia is about to become involved in a 
strategic setting of asymmetry that Finland struggled with during the entire cold war period. Since 
this will be a new circumstance for the region, adaptation to asymmetry cannot be studied in the East 
Asian context. Thus adaptation strategies of other regions will have to be used even if they could only 
offer speculative, partial evidence in support of further conceptual discussion in East Asia.   
